The Role of Objective Good Faith in Current Contract Law: For a General Duty of Inter Partes Cooperation and Solidarity by Barroso, Lucas Abreu & Sthel, Laio Portes
 
 
THE ROLE OF OBJECTIVE GOOD FAITH IN CURRENT 
CONTRACT LAW: FOR A GENERAL DUTY OF INTER 
PARTES COOPERATION AND SOLIDARITY 
Lucas Abreu Barroso∗ and Laio Portes Sthel† 
Abstract ....................................................................................... 187 
I. Introduction ............................................................................. 188 
II. Objectives ............................................................................... 190 
III. Methodology ......................................................................... 191 
IV. Results and Discussions ........................................................ 193 
V. Conclusions ............................................................................ 205 
 
ABSTRACT 
Seen from the historical-cultural perspective, theoretical 
models of modernity, still present in law, are anachronistic before 
the increasingly complex and dynamic contemporary reality. In 
this scenario, and with the aim of providing a renewal of Brazilian 
Civil Law, the 2002 Civil Code was developed with several 
general clauses. Among them is the general clause of objective 
good faith and in the midst of its practical uses is its role in 
establishing the “attached duties”. The doctrine that discusses this 
topic, however, runs counter to the epistemological assumptions 
adopted in this study and thereby is insufficient and contradictory 
in relation to the understanding of today's contractual reality. 
Therefore, it is important to build a new rationale for objective 
good faith, starting from the critical-methodological approach. In 
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this perspective, there is the need to think of an inter partes general 
duty. This, in turn, should find its foundation on cooperation and 
solidarity, in view of the prospective constitutionalization of the 
national civil law and the quest for civil law as an effective tool of 
autonomous but responsible human fulfillment. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The legal phenomenon, a cultural product of humanity, has an 
inherent connection with the standards which exist at any given 
place or time. In addition to political and sociological thought, it is 
closely related to the dominant concepts within a historical and 
social context, and obtains from this context the vectors that will 
illuminate the development of its basic concepts.1 In this sense, 
law was perceived in different ways at various historical moments 
in Western civilization—after all, the Roman jurist’s approach 
towards legal issues was very different from that of the medieval 
jurist, whose attitude, in turn, differed from that of the modern age 
jurist.2 Therefore, and in view of the aim of the research project 
proposed by the advisor for this sub-project, the contemporary 
jurist, without losing sight of contributions of the past legal 
thought, must also assume his historicity. He should also seek to 
respond to new demands—arising out of the progression of 
society—in a way that is consistent with the cultural context in 
which he operates. 
In this sense, it may be asserted that theoretical models 
constructed in modernity, characteristic of the industrial age, are in 
crisis because they no longer match the current reality, which is 
marked by pluralism, cultural and economic globalization, and the 
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complexity of the social texture.3 Thus, the mathematical concept 
of law is unfounded. That concept identified law as a closed 
system through which legal reasoning was regulated by logical 
deduction and whose applied methodology had a markedly 
exegetical nature. Now, legal thought must take account of a new 
epistemological paradigm, characterized by complexity, and that 
challenges the truths and dogmas established by traditional legal 
doctrine.4 
Given this renewed view of reality, and in the face of the need 
to readjust legal thought, new legislative techniques have arisen, of 
which the general clauses are a powerful example. Due to the 
imprecise meaning caused by vague terminology and expressions 
contained in their normative hypotheses, these clauses have the 
function of making the legal system more open and flexible to new 
social demands.5 The current Civil Code of 2002 was prepared 
precisely in this spirit and, for this reason, is filled with general 
clauses which, in theory, favor the approximation of the legal text 
to the mutability of everyday human relations. 
Specifically in the field of civil law, the general clause of 
objective good faith reflects such a systematic opening, and 
determines a range of developments not only in the obligational 
and contractual context, but also in civil law as a whole.6 That is 
because “the advancement of civil law, in terms of concrete 
solutions during the present century, is due to the recourse to good 
faith”7 and “at present, the growth areas of civil law . . . keep 
connected with good faith.”8 
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Amidst the multiple purposes of the above clause, its role in 
establishing duties for the parties during the existence of the 
contract stands out. However, such duties, according to traditional 
doctrine would have only an ancillary, attached, integrative or 
parallel function to contractual obligations. In other words, they 
would simply be a means of providing correct progress or an 
optimization to the unfolding of the contractual relationship,9 
acting to assist in the development of obligational prestations 
contractually established. 
However, if there is recognition that the duties established 
because of objective good faith are housed in much deeper levels 
of law based on the very nature of good faith as the “general vector 
of the legal system,”10 how does one speak of it as having a merely 
auxiliary nature? After all, if concrete solutions based on good 
faith express a true return to the ultimate purposes of law,11 it 
seems appropriate to reflect on the profound role of this institution, 
as opposed to the strictly ancillary action of the duties extracted 
from it. More than that, it is necessary to investigate to which areas 
of the legal life good faith allegedly connects and are manifested in 
its realization. Such investigations, because of the growing 
phenomenon of constitutionalization of the Brazilian Civil Law, 
require conjugation with the fundamental objective of “building a 
free, just and solidary society,”12 and the republican foundation of 
the dignity of the human person.13 
II. OBJECTIVES 
Having demarcated the assumptions and issues of this research, 
we stress that the study of the proposed theme hints at the need to 
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identify not accessory duties imposed by objective good faith, but 
a general duty which is consistent with the socio-cultural 
fluctuations impacting contracts and civil law as a whole. Thus, the 
research sub-project is aimed primarily at determining whether, 
from objective good faith and the plexus of utilities that it 
represents, it would be possible to extract the idea of a general duty 
of cooperation and solidarity to be observed by the parties in the 
course of the contractual relationship. Moreover, the study seeks to 
determine if such a duty represents a need in current Brazilian law 
that the parties cooperate during contract performance in the name 
of objective good faith and based on solidary constitutional 
dictates. 
As for specific objectives proposed in the original sub-project, 
it is possible to summarize them as follows: (i) to deepen the 
understanding of the social context of post-modernity that arises as 
a backdrop to the changes undergone by law—such a purpose, as 
discussed in the results and discussion section, was vitally 
important to guide the improvement of conclusions; and (ii) to 
understand the relevance of objective good faith in establishing a 
possible general duty of cooperation and solidarity—a duty 
founded on constitutional dictates—investigating the limits and 
limitations of such theoretical construct. 
These are the objectives of this sub-project, which are expected 
to have been achieved successfully and consistently from the 
methodology applied and theoretical references used. 
III. METHODOLOGY 
This research adopted the critical-methodological line of 
investigation,14 as it was done based on theses that have emerged 
from the developments affecting both legal thought and the 
methodology of realization of law in post-modernity. Within this 
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line, we have chosen the legal-theoretical perspective,15 to 
delineate a possible new duty, of general character, from the 
comparison between the theoretical constructs already made about 
objective good faith and the new demands arising from social 
practice. Therefore, the rationale employed was based on the 
vision of law as a practical science, focused on its implementation 
and the effective solution to concrete problems. Moreover, legal-
exploratory and legal-interpretative types of research were 
conducted to outline an initial overview of the problem and, from 
that, to interpret the data of legal reality and its needs.16 
Having presented the perspectives adopted in the development 
of the sub-project, we emphasize that the reflection on the theme 
was based primarily on bibliographical research in the works cited 
herein. Books and papers of importance in regard to contracts and 
objective good faith were used. The highlights are the works of 
António Manuel da Rocha Menezes Cordeiro (2007) and Judith 
Martins-Costa (1999), which are references required on this 
subject, and also those books that helped us understand the legal 
phenomenon in a way that was largely different from the one that 
guided us in the beginning of this research. Emphasis is placed on 
the study of the writings of Francisco Amaral and António 
Castanheira Neves,17 whose ius-philosophical ponderings largely 
contributed to rethinking the current sense of law and its problems, 
promoting the investigation of the reflexes of these meditations on 
the results of this sub-project. 
In addition, meetings between the advisor and members of the 
research group linked to the main project were conducted during 
which it was possible to exchange information of mutual relevance 
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for the advisees and to obtain input from debates and discussions 
aimed at better understanding law in the current historical and 
cultural context as well as understanding its reverberations on the 
theme of this sub-project. 
Finally, it is noted that due to the highly theoretical direction 
given to this research, the jurisprudential research proposed in the 
sub-project became unnecessary. For this reason, the research on 
the rulings of the Superior Court of Justice was not carried out, in 
order to maintain consistency with the search for legal and 
theoretical foundations for the proposed theme. 
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
Just as the legal phenomenon is not divorced from the 
historical and cultural reality that surrounds it, in light of what was 
already presented in the introduction of this report, so objective 
good faith must also be observed from the perspective of a certain 
understanding of law in space and time. As Menezes Cordeiro 
asserts, good faith cannot be reduced to the idea of a common legal 
institution, but rather expresses the completeness of an “. . . 
important cultural factor, linked closely to a certain understanding 
of the legal phenomenon.”18 Given the depth and relevance of 
Cordeiro’s study, it is worth investigating this Portuguese jurist’s 
understanding of law and good faith as well as his contributions to 
the overall comprehension of good faith and of the panorama 
surrounding it. 
In the introduction to his work, Menezes Cordeiro lays the 
epistemological postulates on which he will build the development 
of his thought about good faith. From the defense of legal 
dogmatics and of the eminently scientific character of law, the 
Portuguese jurist explains that every legal phenomenon is positive 
and that although it is not exhausted in the legal order given, 
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dogmatics plants its roots in the same positiveness.19 Thus, even if 
good faith does not conform to the classical subsumptive 
interpretation/application, and even if it is impossible to define it in 
legal and positive terms—the role of jurisprudence being to fill its 
content in the concrete case—good faith should be seen in a 
dogmatic way to escape from what the author calls a 
methodological unreality and the ensuing mythification of this civil 
institution.20 These phenomena, pointed out and criticized by the 
author under discussion, emanate from the difficulty of the 
scientific understanding of the developments concerning good faith 
obtained from jurisprudence: the jurists who proposed to study it 
are guided by merely formal, grandiose propositions that do not 
provide sufficient material criteria for a decision, which therefore 
leads to mythification of the concept of objective good faith—i.e., 
an institution “. . . where all hopes are possible.”21 
Thus, to circumvent these methodological difficulties, Menezes 
Cordeiro starts from German jurisprudence in order to extract the 
duties that the parties must observe in the unfolding of the 
contractual relationship, establishing a tripartite division into duties 
of protection, loyalty and information or clarification.22 However, 
he points out that the duty of protection, as it is designed in a 
unified way by German legal thought, has no applicability in legal 
systems where there is the possibility of extracting the same 
practical result from the rules relating to extra-contractual 
liability,23 as is the case of Brazil.24 
Therefore, it is possible to infer that the attached duties would 
be restricted to the others: (i) loyalty—the duty to assume behavior 
that provides an accurate and honest negotiation, encompassing 
duties of care, confidentiality and consequent action, and (ii) 
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information or clarification—the duty to provide all information 
necessary for the contract to be finalized and performed honestly.25 
The consideration of these duties emerges from the already-
consolidated visualization of the intra-obligational complexity that 
surpasses the traditional bipolar view of debit and credit to 
recognize the obligation as a reality also composed of other 
elements.26 Thus, besides the main prestation, embodied in human 
behavior to be performed by the debtor in favor of the creditor, 
there would exist various other material operations and conducts to 
be taken by the contracting parties—among them compliance with 
certain legal requirements, such as the attached duties of objective 
good faith.27 
Incidentally, as Menezes Cordeiro puts it, the nature of these 
duties under discussion is essentially legal, because objective good 
faith comes from within the positive legal system, i.e., it reminds 
all under its jurisdiction that we are still dealing with the 
application of positive law and its science.28 Moreover, the same 
author argues that to achieve good faith, it is necessary to bear in 
mind two principles: the protection of trust and the materiality of 
legal regulation. The first principle turns to the protection of 
legitimate expectations generated in the other contracting party or 
adherence to representations that this party deems effective,29 
while the second principle represents the fight against legal 
formalism and its blind obedience to the legal rules and against 
pure syllogism.30 These would, in short, be the vectors to be 
followed in achieving good faith in cases being decided. 
As one can see, Menezes Cordeiro does not shun the idea that 
law is essentially positive and therefore systematic, even if it is still 
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an open, mobile, heterogeneous and cybernetic system.31 In this 
conception, good faith appears as a legal element that provides the 
entry of extra-systematic elements into the set of prescriptive 
propositions legally established, enriching the legal system and 
allowing its malleability when facing concrete cases. The attached 
duties thus would be inserted into this dogmatic conception of law, 
serving as a way to model contractual relationships in the senses 
that the legal system itself and its ultimate purposes would provide. 
Judith Martins-Costa, another prominent name in the study of 
objective good faith, understands the matter in a similar fashion. 
We will now discuss her views in order to complete the study of 
the state of the art the theme is in the dominant legal thought. In 
fact, the above-mentioned Brazilian jurist sees good faith as a 
useful way to “. . . the construction of a substantial sense of law, 
acting as a model able to develop an open system . . .”32—or 
rather, a relatively open system or a system of relative self-
reference, since the full opening could result in an incongruent de-
systematization.33 
Thus, objective good faith, set in a general clause in the civil 
code, could cause this systematic opening of the legal system—
making it porous to the insertion of elements then regarded as 
extra-legal. At the same time, good faith would generate an 
internal mobility. That is, it would provide the return or re-
forwarding of the solution given in the concrete case to the 
provisions within the legal system.34 Effectively, according to the 
author mentioned, objective good faith should be praised for 
dispensing with the closed design of law, allowing, in addition to 
this internal system modification, a re-systematization of the 
elements which escape the boundaries of positive legal rules, 
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 32. MARTINS-COSTA, supra note 9, at 382. 
 33. Id. at 275. 
 34. Id. at 341. 
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rearranging them within the very system.35 Consequently, from 
this line of thinking, it follows that objective good faith would 
favor an intermittent readjustment and a constant innovation of 
law. 
With respect to the attached duties themselves, Martins-Costa 
is also guided by the changes in the obligational process to 
substantiate their existence. She adds, thus, that the obligational 
relationship must be seen through the prism of its intrinsic 
dynamics, from an overall and process-based view of the 
obligation: this would “. . . encompass, in a permanent flow, all the 
vicissitudes, ‘cases’ and problems that may be taken to it—[an 
obligation] that moves processually, once invented and developed 
in light of a purpose . . . .”36 Among these events are the attached, 
accessory or instrumental duties, whose dependence on the specific 
case for their determination and consequent changeability is 
stressed by Martins-Costa with the aim of justifying—unlike 
Menezes Cordeiro—her preference for not reducing and 
numbering them dogmatically. In fact, the quoted jurist lays out an 
illustrative list of such duties, into which she even inserts a duty of 
“collaboration and cooperation” and refers to the fact that such 
duties, in general, are called “duties of cooperation and protection 
of mutual interests.”37 
For the application of the general clause of objective good faith 
and, consequently, to determine the duties to be followed by 
contracting parties in a specific case, Martins-Costa defends a 
required distance from the axiomatic-deductive method: in her 
opinion, the most appropriate methodology to be adopted is 
juridical topics coming from Theodor Vieweg’s theories.38 
Although criticized by Menezes Cordeiro,39 “topic reasoning” is 
presented by Martins-Costa as essentially problem-oriented (and 
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therefore operative and pragmatic), conforming very well to the 
way objective good faith demands its implementation,40 without 
abandoning the systematic thinking altogether. Both are 
complementarily dialectical and are at the root of the development 
of an open system.41 
Thus, comparatively, it is observed that while maintaining the 
defense of a distinct methodology for the realization of objective 
good faith and the “attached duties”, both authors based their 
epistemological assumptions on similar pillars. Menezes Cordeiro 
is firm in the conviction that the principles of materiality of legal 
regulation and trust must be adopted as guiding tools for the 
achievement of objective good faith, whereas Martins-Costa 
prefers juridical topics for achieving this desideratum. Here lie 
some of the main difficulties encountered during the research 
proposed by the sub-project: the jurists discussed here, 
representatives of the dominant legal current on the subject, see 
objective good faith from a dogmatic and systematic view of the 
legal phenomenon, nevertheless they start from an open 
understanding of this phenomenon. This way, even though both 
reject the mere subsumptive logic of application of law, their 
conceptions collide with the gnosiological bases already outlined 
in the introduction to this report, which illuminated the 
continuation of this research and the studies conducted between the 
advisor and advisees. Thus, as we search for a different foundation 
for objective good faith, it is imperative to note how contractual 
reality and its underlying economic dimension—regulated by such 
institution and its attached duties—have been faced. 
Like any legal institution, the contract is subject to what can be 
termed as “. . . the principle of historical relativity . . . .”42 This is 
meant to say that the contract is also subject to historical 
                                                                                                             
 40. MARTINS-COSTA, supra note 9, at 371-72. 
 41. Id. at 376-77. 
 42. ENZO ROPPO, O CONTRATO 347-48 (Ana Coimbra & M. Januário C. 
Gomes trans., Almedina 2009). 
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contingencies that mark its understanding. And any position 
intending to establish an alleged unitary and universal “essence” of 
contract, extracted from a single strand of legal knowledge, is open 
to criticism. In fact, today the fragmentation that permeates 
postmodern contract theory is recognizable; as the contract is 
marked by varied facets, it becomes impractical to obtain a concept 
that is unique and revealing of its structure.43 Even the 
standardization of exchanges do not determine the “death” of the 
contract, but the readjustment of its discipline in face of today's 
dynamic socio-economic requirements.44 
This, however, does not preclude the possibility to outline 
some general lines of the profile of contracts. These, incidentally, 
are traditionally defined as “. . . two or more parties agreeing to 
constitute, regulate or extinguish a legal patrimonial 
relationship.”45 Thus, the patrimonial nature, or better, the 
economic nature is the element that marks the contract, as the 
contract is realized solely in relationships that have the economic 
nature as their basic component.46 This does not mean that the 
contractual universe is tied to a mere idea of exchange; a donation, 
for example, is also characterized as being a contract, because it is 
also a means of the circulation of wealth. 
In this sense, the contract is a genuine legal-formal garment for 
economic operations—where such garment is not present, one 
cannot identify the existence of a contract.47 Therefore, as a legal 
concept, the contract is intended to regulate the objective 
                                                                                                             
 43. Lucas Barroso, A teoria do contrato no paradigma constitucional, 84 
REVISTA DE DIREITO DO CONSUMIDOR 163 (2012). 
 44. PIETRO PERLINGIERI, O DIREITO CIVIL NA LEGALIDADE CONSTITUCIONAL 
397 (Maria Cristina De Cicco trans., Renovar 2008).  
 45. CESARE BIANCA, DERECHO CIVIL: EL CONTRATO 23 (Fernando 
Hinestrosa & Édgar Cortés trans., Universidad Externado de Colombia 2007). 
(Free translation from Spanish. Original text: “. . .el acuerdo de dos o más 
partes para constituir, regular o extinguir entre ellas una relación jurídica 
patrimonial”.) 
 46. LUCAS BARROSO, AMANDA MORRIS, ET. AL., DIREITO DOS CONTRATOS 
40 (Revista dos Tribunais 2008). 
 47. ROPPO, supra note 42, at 11. 
200 JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES [Vol. 8 
 
 
 
circulation of wealth, whether current or potential, from one person 
to another, depending on the direction and organization one wants 
to give to the interests involved in the realization of the economic 
operations.48 It is seen, accordingly, that the contract appears as an 
instrument immersed in the economic and social context: it is the 
legal and formal translation of such context, with a view to the 
formation of a complex body of rules that protect the interests of 
the contracting parties. 
In terms of legislative developments, it is known that the 
classical contractual paradigm, derived from the Enlightenment 
context of the eighteenth century, influenced the first legal contract 
systematics, inserted into the Napoleonic Code of 1804. However, 
the strictly conceptual overview outlined earlier did not prevent 
contractual theory, since its origin, from playing an ideological 
role. The contract actually became “. . . the flag of societies born 
out of bourgeois revolutions and, ultimately, an element of their 
legitimacy.”49 So, one understands the deep connection between 
the conceptual roots of contract theory and the economic goals of 
the emerging bourgeois class, aimed, ultimately, at the 
consolidation of the capitalist system as a prevailing mode of 
production. 
This perspective becomes even more latent when we better 
analyze the core of primal contract theory, namely, freedom of 
choice, today recognized as private autonomy.50 To begin with, 
private autonomy can be defined as the power by which the legal 
system establishes the possibility of holders of rights to determine 
the juridicization of their activities, choosing the legal effects to be 
                                                                                                             
 48. Id. at 9, 13. 
 49. Id. at 28. 
 50. As a result of in-depth studies on private autonomy and its current 
problems in face of the concrete contractual relations, we co-authored the 
following scientific article for the XXI National Congress of CONPEDI: Jussara 
Gomes & Laio Sthel, O atual dilema da autonomia privada: entre a teorética 
contratual e a efetividade das práticas sociais in RELAÇÕES PRIVADAS E 
DEMOCRACIA 164-83 (Otávio Luiz Rodrigues Jr.; Giordano Bruno Soares 
Roberto & Nelson Luiz Pinto (coords.), FUNJAB 2012). 
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produced.51 However, and beyond this purely doctrinal construct, 
one sees that, at its root, the defense of autonomy to all individuals 
had been determined by the need to declare the freedom of workers 
from the bonds that harnessed them to the land of the feudal lords 
in order that they might serve as free labor to the rising 
bourgeoisie.52 In the words of Ana Prata, “the connection between 
the worker and the means of production is only possible by 
agreement between the worker and the owner of these means.”53 
It is noted, however, that the defense of private autonomy and 
its legal significance emerged at the time of the final collapse of 
feudalism and of the capitalist expansion, thus determining the 
universalization of the latter and of other favorable concepts to the 
consolidation of this economic system of production. In such 
context, the juridical transaction, under which the contract is the 
largest exponent, is revealed as true affirmation of individual 
freedom and economic freedom of all.54 However, it must be said 
that the exaltation of freedom and equality among individuals, at 
that juncture, did not leave the theoretical field; the abstraction of 
these principles, in fact, served to conceal the deep substantial 
inequalities, in particular relating to the economic and social power 
between the parties, so as to disguise the existence of materially 
unfair agreements of the will, hence the affirmation of the 
ideological function embedded in the origins of the legal construct 
of contracts.55 
Thus, having made this historical digression on classical 
contract theory and its essential pillar, private autonomy, we need 
to emphasize that such a bourgeois-liberal paradigm does not seem 
so far away from the civilian legal thought in contemporary times. 
                                                                                                             
 51. Diogo de Melo. Princípios do direito contratual: autonomia privada, 
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Indeed, although there is a plurality that permeates the contractual 
phenomenon, which is felt in the presence of different paradigms 
in action, it is important to point to the fact that, in light of Maria 
Luiza Feitosa’s views, the image of the contract extracted from 
liberal rationality would still prevail.56 This author adds that “in 
the national context, for example, contracts that objectively fit in 
the legal system and do not involve consumer relationships have 
not changed, to the point of seeing in that system, the exhaustion of 
the classical paradigm.”57 Thus, the concept of contract as a 
meeting of free wills based on a formal freedom and equality 
continues to influence civilian doctrine and pertinent legislation. 
This fact, in turn, must be taken into account when analyzing 
the basis given to objective good faith. Effectively, throughout the 
development of the research, the analysis of the contract panorama 
proved of great value in that it hinted at how the theory that 
embraces it remains imbued, in many respects, with nineteenth-
century liberal-bourgeois individualism. Thus, to affirm the strictly 
incidental and integrative nature of the attached duties is to adopt 
an acritical position on the very reality with which one is dealing. 
After all, if such duties are simple guidelines directed to the “. . . 
exact processing of the obligational relationship . . .”,58 i.e., the 
pursuit of contractual purposes embodied in the due performance, 
nothing else they will be doing than condone the ideological bias 
found in the intricacies of contract theory and which hides the 
actual inter partes inequalities. 
Following this conclusion, how may law resolve this problem 
more fully if it is regarded—in the view adopted by Menezes 
Cordeiro—as lacking of a reductionism to become operative in the 
face of the growing complexity of modern societies?59 Now, the 
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legal phenomenon, according to what has been repeatedly asserted 
in this report, cannot be taken as the product of an axiomatic and 
simplified perspective. Law must essentially confront this 
complexity, since it emanated from it. After all, if today's laws no 
longer exclusively form a legal statute, becoming the result of 
political contingencies and partisan forces, it is necessary, 
according to the teachings of António Castanheira Neves, that: 
. . . [T]he (committedly) political nature of the legislative 
function must have its counter-pole in the (autonomously 
legal) nature of the jurisdictional function. In this sense, but 
only in this sense, one can speak of the ‘Vom Gesetzesstaat 
zum Richterstaat’ evolution (R. Maric) which, since thus 
understood, is beyond the question of the (democratic) 
legitimacy of the jurisdictional function in terms of its 
legally creative manifestations, because it is not a dispute 
between powers, it is not even assigning ‘Alle Macht den 
Richtern’ and thus the eventual emergence of the 
‘government of judges’, but it is to assert law to power, the 
possibility to ultimately recognize law as a constitutively 
unfailing dimension of the state and so truly [recognize] the 
state as rule-of-law.60 
Therefore, if the desire to keep law as an effective counterpoint 
to power in its political-legislative manifestation still exists, law 
cannot be returned to mere legality, nor to a dogmatics said to be, 
paradoxically, open to what is called “meta-legal concepts.” It is 
noteworthy that, regarding the author mentioned, not even the 
general clauses served to overcome the alienation suffered by 
formalist rationality when closing law in on itself.61 
From these conclusions, this research sought to lay a renewed 
foundation to objective good faith so that it is observed through a 
prism of a practical and jurisprudential analysis in which its 
usefulness in the judicative-decisory realization of law becomes a 
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time of full reach of the major objectives of legal existence. 
Bearing in mind the growing movement of constitutionalization of 
civil law, in which “values proposed by the Constitution are 
present in every corner of the normative fabric,”62 we recognize 
the direct application of constitutional principles to legal 
relationships established in a traditional civil rights context.63 
Starting from this premise we need, therefore, to reflect on the 
influence of the precepts contained in the 1988 Major Law [The 
Constitution] on the study of objective good faith and on the 
outlining of the duties arising out of it. 
Constitutional civil law may be understood as the culmination 
of a renewal in the fundamentals of this branch of private law, 
favored by the democratic Constitution. Its central axis is the 
existential domain of the human being, i.e., the humanization of 
national civil law.64 Thus, by the proclamation of justice and social 
solidarity65 and human dignity,66 the current Constitution helped us 
see the demand for democratization of civil law, starting from its 
change of basic foundation, i.e., from patrimoniality to the human 
person as the ultimate foundation of private law. In this sense one 
can say, in the words of Paulo Lôbo, “the restoration of the 
primacy of the human person in civil relationships is the first 
condition to adapt law to reality and to the constitutional 
foundations.”67 Incidentally, the caveat is that the 
constitutionalization of civil law does not intend to eliminate 
patrimoniality from relationships regulated by it, but to give them 
new significance in favor of a legal protection that is qualitatively 
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different, so that the economic situation may serve as support for 
people’s full development, and not vice versa.68 
Moreover, it is necessary to emphasize that, to avoid falling 
back into a dogmatic legalism, the Brazilian Constitution should 
also be seen as a product of historical and political contingencies. 
It would not be consistent, therefore, to visualize it absolutely 
blindly and acritically. We advocate that the Basic Law, like any 
other piece of legislation, be seen as one (not the only) axis of 
realization of law and it must justify itself before legal principles 
and the concrete case itself.69 It is in this sense, finally, that the 
prospective constitutionalization is accredited, i.e., it firms up the 
commitment to the “. . . steady journey that captures the historical, 
cultural meanings of codes and rewrites, through the re-
signification of these linguistic beacons, the limits and the 
emancipatory possibilities of law itself.”70 
In this step, the study of objective good faith undertaken in this 
research reaps its foundations on such a perspective, since good 
faith, as any civil legal institution, cannot escape the social 
commitments, already constitutionally assumed. Only then will we 
be able to see the importance of objective good faith as a legal 
principle governing the exercise of contractual prerogatives by 
making private autonomy, and therefore contracts, essentially 
subjected to social solidarity.71 It is in this sense, finally, that the 
findings of this research will be established. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
Given the relevance of objective good faith in the design of the 
current profile of today’s contracts,72 its study becomes important 
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due to the sense that one wants to give to contractual relations and 
their underlying economic transactions. At the end of this research, 
it is therefore possible to summarize the conclusions as follows: 
1) The systematic understanding of objective good faith 
intended to emphasize its importance in the methodological 
renewal of the realization of law, from a dogmatic bias and 
therefore, reductionist. However, we hope to have demonstrated 
that the current human reality is much more complex and dynamic 
than the legal system can assume. The legal system will always be 
doubly exceeded, either by the principles that determine the 
evaluative agenda of the community project, or by the historical 
reality that it is intended.73 Thus, the understanding of objective 
good faith must be based on another perspective which is 
historical-problematic and that effectively put civil law and its 
institutions at the service of the human person. 
2) The doctrine of attached duties becomes insufficient and 
barely profitable when contrasted with the epistemological 
assumptions on which this research was based. Indeed, to defend 
the idea that duties coming out of objective good faith have an 
ancillary nature is to serve the mere achievement of individualistic 
purposes of contracts. Therefore, the end result is corroborating 
with the old classical liberal paradigm that still permeates the 
dominant contractual theory, without having a critical perspective 
on actual reality regulated. 
3) To avoid this problematic subordination of good faith to 
classical contract theory, it is therefore necessary to enforce a 
general duty that—beyond purely individualistic impulses of the 
parties—stands as an actual curb to private autonomy. In view of 
the foregoing, it is concluded that the perspective outlined at the 
end of this research can provide the concept of objective good faith 
as an ethical-normative element of effective re-signification of 
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contractual relations established in our times, serving as a 
sufficient basis for what is advocated here. 
4) This general duty, in view of the increasing 
constitutionalization of civil law, should pass through the ideals of 
solidarity and cooperation, so that the contracting parties seek the 
satisfaction of their goals with concern for the legal position of the 
other. It is in this sense that economicity, inherent to the idea of 
economic transactions to which the contracts serve as a legal 
garment, must follow. Only then may objective good faith be 
consistent with the renewal suffered by civil law, especially in 
regard to the search for its concept as an instrument of autonomous 
but responsible human fulfillment. 
